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1. Introduction  
 
The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of political ideology on 
sustainable development. The value of doing this is two-fold. First, in the face of 
important social challenges, ranging from climate change to aging populations, the 
question of sustainable development has become a top priority for many observers and 
policy makers (Arrow et al., 2004). Sustainability is closely related to investment in a 
society’s capital stocks broadly conceived to include manufactured, human, and natural 
capital and referred to as genuine wealth. A country that is running down its genuine 
wealth is on an unsustainable development path and will experience falling welfare 
levels even if in the short-term its GDP per capita is raising. More precisely, inter-
temporal social welfare of a society is increasing if and only net investment in its 
genuine wealth is positive (Dasgupta and Mäler, 2000; Arrow et al., 2003). Since these 
investments can, in principle, be measured (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003; World Bank, 
2006), it is possible to study empirically the determinants of sustainable development 
and doing so is of first order importance (Dasgupta, 2010). Second, sustainability is 
intrinsically linked to issues of governance. As noted, sustainable development requires 
investment in society’s capital assets and decisions on these investments are the 
outcome of a political decision making process. Aspects of this nexus have been 
investigated previously. Aidt (2011), for example, shows that corruption has a robust 
negative influence on sustainable development, while legal institutions that govern the 
way disputes are settled make little difference. Aidt and Veiga (2016) study the link 
between political institutions that define the general framework that governs decision 
making in a society and find a positive link between institutional quality and sustainable 
development. We add to this literature by studying whether short-term fluctuations in 
3 
 
the political ideology of the government (measured on a left-right scale) induce 
fluctuations in genuine investment. 
Specifically, we use a panel of 79 countries between 1981 and 2013 to study the 
relationship between political ideology and growth in genuine investment. We find that 
right-wing governments are associated with improvements in genuine investment while 
genuine wealth tends to be run down under left-wing governments. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an introduction 
to the theory underlying using genuine investment as an index of sustainable 
development and develops hypothesises linking investment in genuine wealth to the 
partisan cycle. Section 3 presents the data and the econometric approach. Section 4 
presents the main results related to political ideology and genuine investment. Section 5 
investigates the interplay between the years a party has been in power, political ideology 
and genuine investment. Section 6 offers a broader discussion of the results. 
 2. Theoretical background and hypothesises 
 
The World Commission (1997) loosely defines sustainable development as a 
current economic path that does not compromise the well-being of future generations. 
Following Arrow et al. (2004), we adopt a more specific definition and say that a 
society is on a sustainable path if the present discounted value of the social welfare 
attained at each future date (its intertemporal social welfare) is not decreasing along that 
path. The advantage of this definition is that it puts the concept on a sound welfare 
theoretical foundation1 and that it offers an operational bridge between theory and 
                                                          
1 In a recent survey, Fleurbaey (2009) highlights three main approaches to the measurement of social 
welfare: adjusted GDP, happiness indices, and the Human Development Index based on A. K. Sen’s 
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empirical measurement. Dasgupta and Mäler (2000) proved that at society’s inter-
temporal social welfare at time t is increasing if, and only if, the net investment in its 
genuine wealth is positive (see also Dasgupta, 2001; 2010). Genuine wealth refers to the 
society’s capital stocks broadly defined to include manufactured, human and natural 
capital and genuine investment is simply the additions to the various stocks valued at 
appropriately defined shadow prices. We return to the matter of how genuine 
investment can be measured empirically in the next section, but before we do that we 
discuss why partisan politics and elections, more generally, may induce cycles in 
genuine investment. 
Whether a society at a given point in time moves along a sustainable 
development path or not is determined by the institutions that govern investment in 
genuine wealth. In democratic societies, these investment choices are made by elected 
politicians and the political parties they represent. The ideological position of the ruling 
government is likely to influence the scale, timing and composition of these 
investments. Elections provide citizens with a mechanism for selecting new 
governments and, as a consequence, parties with different ideologies gain and lose 
control of government at election time. Our hypothesis is that this induces partisan 
cycles in genuine savings and that a society over time may move on and off a 
sustainable economic path. The classical works by Hibbs (1977, 1987) and Alesina 
(1987) have shown how partisan cycles can emerge in macroeconomic aggregates 
because left-party governments are more inclined than right-party ones to pursue 
expansive policies designed to yield lower unemployment and higher growth, but 
running the risk of extra inflation. A more recent literature establishes how party 
ideology influences the size and scope of government with left-wing governments being 
                                                                                                                                                                          
capability approach. We focus on the first of these because it can, in contrast to the other measures, 
address issues related to sustainable development directly (Dasgupta, 2001, chapter 9; Dasgupta, 2010). 
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more expansionary than right-wing governments (Pickering and Rockey, 2011; 2013) 
while right-wing governments are more willing to deregulate labour markets (Bjørnskov 
and Potrafke, 2012; 2013) and to promote deregulation of the energy, transport and 
communication industries (Potrafke, 2010).2 
We conjecture that the fiscal conservatism of right-wing parties and their greater 
willingness to deregulate the economy will positively influence investment into 
manufactured capital and concentrate public spending on provision of merit goods like 
education at the expense of welfare programmes. The later effect is reinforced by the 
findings of Kauder and Potrafke (2013) that right-wing parties are more willing to 
mobilise private funds to co-fund higher education. With respect to natural capital 
which is preserved or accumulated through farsighted exploration of natural resources 
and through environmental regulation, it is less clear if right-wing parties will support 
policies that preserve and build-up the stock of natural capital to a larger or smaller 
extend than left-wing parties. Right-wing parties’ general willingness to deregulate 
market may, for example, spill over into a specific unwillingness to regulate 
externalities. It is, therefore, not a priori clear what the nature of the partisan cycle 
might be and the matter must be considered an open empirical question. 
Besides setting the stage for partisan cycles, the election calendar may also 
induce opportunistic cycles. According to the literature on opportunistic political 
business cycles, in their quest for votes, parties from across the ideological spectrum 
may use the fiscal and monetary tools available to them to expand economic activity 
before elections and to calm the economy subsequently to reduce inflationary 
pressures.3 A by-product of this could be a political business cycle in genuine 
                                                          
2 See also Reed (2006), Imbeau et al. (2001), and Frederiksson et al. (2013). 
3 The theoretical foundation for the opportunistic political business cycle was laid by Nordhaus (1975) 
and integrated into rational expectations models by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990). The 
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investment. For example, the short-termism in macroeconomic management induced by 
such opportunistic behaviour may divert attention away from investment in the 
economy’s capital stocks and towards current consumption and in that way create a dip 
in genuine investment around elections. However, whether the unintended 
consequences of opportunistic attempts to manipulate the macroeconomy are 
sufficiently strong to create a political business cycle in genuine investment must also 
be considered an open empirical question. 
 3. Data and Econometric Specification 
 
To investigate the interplay between ideology, elections and genuine investment, 
we use an unbalanced panel dataset of 79 countries between 1981 and 2013. To be 
included in the sample, a country must have regular elections over the relevant period.4 
The countries in the sample are listed in the note to Table 1. Our sample includes 
countries from Europe, the Americas, Africa, Oceania, the Middle East, and Asia. 
In order to test for partisan cycles in genuine investment, we need two primary 
inputs. Firstly, we need empirical estimates of genuine investment across time and 
space. The World Bank, as part of the World Development Indicators (WDI), publishes 
those estimates (in percentage of gross national income - GNI). Their estimates of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
literature has recently been surveyed by Dubois (2016). Empirical studies suggest that favorable 
economic conditions in the lead-up to an election do benefit the incumbent government (Hibbs, 2006). 
4 Specifically, we use the Legislative and Executive Indices of Electoral Competitiveness from the 
Database of Political Institutions (DPI) which scores countries on a 1 to 7 scale. We excluded countries 
with a value lower than 6. This means that we include countries (during periods) in which they had 
competitive elections where multiple parties did win seats. A score of 6 indicates that the largest party 
received more than 75% of the seats while a score of 7 indicates that it won less than that. 
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genuine investment are obtained by making four adjustments to gross national savings.5 
The first adjustment is to deduct an estimate of consumption of fixed capital to account 
for depreciation of manufactured capital. The second adjustment is to add an estimate of 
investment in human capital. Public expenditure on education is used as a proxy for 
this. The third adjustment relates to the social cost of environmental pollution.6 The 
fourth adjustment is also environmentally motivated. It seeks to account for energy 
depletion, mineral depletion, and net forest depletion by subtracting an estimate of the 
relevant resource rents from net national savings.7 The result of these adjustments of 
gross national savings provides a rough estimate of genuine investment in terms of the 
percentage of gross national income (GNI). We follow Arrow et al. (2003) and convert 
this into an estimate of growth in genuine wealth per capita (GWgrowth) by multiplying 
genuine investment as percentage of GNI by a presumed GNI-wealth ratio8 and by 
subtracting the population growth rate from that product. 
Secondly, we need empirical measures of political ideology. Constructing 
indicators of government ideology is complicated by the fact that there exist substantial 
differences in party and parliamentary systems across the countries in our sample and 
by the fact that coalition governments consisting of two or more parties with different 
ideologies can be coded in different ways. We use the classification (EXECRLC) 
                                                          
5 For details on how it is computed see Arrow el al. (2003). The WDI use the term “adjusted net savings” 
to describe what we refer as “genuine investment”. 
6 It has two parts. The first is designed to capture the cost of global warming. An estimate of the social 
cost of carbon dioxide emissions is subtracted from national savings, with the assumption that the average 
social cost of a tonne of carbon is US$30. The second part is designed to capture the impact of local 
environmental degradation. The World Bank makes a financial deduction for an estimate of the health 
damages due to urban air pollution (particulate emissions) from gross savings. 
7 These rents are calculated as the market price of the resource minus average extraction cost for the two 
non-renewable resources (energy and mineral depletion). For renewable forest resources, the rent is 
estimated as the market price per unit of harvest in excess of the natural regeneration rate. 
8 The ratios we use are 0.2 for industrialized countries and 0.15 for developing and oil-rich countries. 
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proposed in the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) to characterize party ideology.9 
The DPI divides parties into three groups based on an evaluation of a party’s orientation 
with respect to economic policy. We define the corresponding indicator variables, Right, 
Left or Center. For single party majority governments, the indictor variable 
corresponding to its ideology takes the value one in years during which the party rules a 
given country. For coalition governments, the DPI classifies a coalition government as 
having the ideology of the largest coalition partner. The group of right-wing parties 
includes conservative, Christian democratic, and other right-wing parties; the group of 
left-wing parities includes communist, socialist, social democratic, and other left-wing 
parties; and the group of Center includes parties defined as centrists or which party 
position can best be described as centrist.10 
To estimate the impact of the political ideology on genuine investment, we 
consider the following dynamic panel specification: 
 
GWgrowthit = ρGWgrowthit-1 + αIdeologyit + βPolit + γEconit + γt + vi + eit (1) 
 
where i=1,…,79 and t=1981,…,2013. The coefficient on the first lag of the dependent 
variable (ρ) measures persistence in the growth rate of genuine wealth per capita 
(GWgrowth). The error structure includes a country specific effect νi, a time fixed effect 
γt and the idiosyncratic error term eit. The vector Ideology includes the indicator 
variables for the ideology of the government. The vectors Pol and Econ include, 
                                                          
9 For the subset of OECD countries and for individual countries (such as the USA and Canada) more 
refined classifications of party ideology exist (see Bjørnskov (2005, 2008); Bjørnskov and Potrafke 
(2012, 2013). 
10 For further information on how the party classification is constructed see the DPI codebook (Keefer, 
2012). 
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respectively, political and economic control variables. Table 1 describes these variables 
in detail. We include two main political control variables in all specifications. The 
variable Election year controls for the timing of elections and enables us to distinguish 
partisan cycles from election cycles. The variable Party tenure records the number of 
years that the government party has been in power. In some specifications, we replace 
this with the variable Leader tenure which records the number of years that the current 
party leader has been in control. This enables us to separate the effect of the political 
ideology of the government from the effect of length in government. In some 
specifications, we also include the Polity IV index which captures the quality of political 
institutions. This allows us to isolate the short to medium term effect of political 
ideology on sustainability from the potential long-run effect of changes in underlying 
political institutions. 
The theory underlying the use of genuine investment as an index of 
sustainability requires us to control for the capital stocks and for the shadow prices 
associated with those stocks. Direct measures of the capital stocks are hard to come by 
and we use the following imperfect proxies: Government consumption, Years of 
schooling, GDP per capita and Urban population ratio. It is even more difficult to find 
proxies for the relevant shadow prices. We note, however, that world market prices can 
in many cases be used as shadow prices for internationally traded goods. This suggests 
that we can use imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP (Trade openness) to proxy 
for this. 
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
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The lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term even if the latter 
is not serially correlated due to country-specific fixed effects νi, This implies that 
Random or Fixed Effects estimates are biased and inconsistent (Baltagi, 2008). 
Estimators that take into account that bias include: (i) bias-corrected estimators; and (ii) 
instrumental variables estimators. Bias-corrected estimators, like the one proposed by 
Bruno (2005a, b) – the bias-corrected least squares dummy variable estimator (LSDVC) 
for dynamic panel data models – are suitable when the number of individuals (N) is 
small (and T is not large enough). Although T is not large in this study, the number of 
individuals cannot be considered small (N=82). Hence, this estimator may not be the 
most suitable choice for us and we estimate equation (1) with an instrumental variables 
estimator.  
According to the large sample properties of the generalized method of moments 
(GMM), the dynamic estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is adequate 
when there is a clear dominance of cross sections over time periods in the sample. This 
is what happens in our panel. Taking first differences of equation (1), levels of the 
explanatory variables can be used as instruments to avoid correlation between lagged 
dependent variable and the country-specific effects. Arellano and Bond (1991) also 
proposed a variant of the GMM estimator, namely the two-step estimator, which utilizes 
the estimated residuals in order to construct a consistent variance-covariance matrix of 
the moment conditions. Although the two-step estimator is asymptotically more 
efficient than the one-step estimator and relaxes the assumption of homoscedasticity, 
the efficiency gains are not that important even in the case of heteroscedastic errors. 
This result is supported by Judson and Owen (1999), who showed empirically that the 
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one-step estimator outperforms the two-step estimator, especially when the number of 
time periods is relatively high (T=30), which is the case in this study.11 
A problem that we have to deal with is the “too many instruments problem”. 
Using too many instruments may result in over-fitting biases. When the number of time 
periods is relatively large, this over-fitting becomes even more serious. The consequent 
large collection of instruments, even if individually valid, can be collectively invalid 
because they over-fit endogenous variables (Doornik et al., 2002; Roodman, 2009a, b). 
They also weaken the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions used to check 
instrument validity. Hence, to minimize the over-fitting problem we use the collapse 
alternative suggested by Roodman (2009b). The empirical results from this panel data 
analysis are presented and discussed in the next section. 
 4. Main Results 
 
Table 2 reports the main empirical results. The specification reported in column 
(1) includes separate indicator variables for left- and right-wing parties. The effect of 
political ideology is, therefore, measured relative to centrist governments. We see that 
growth in genuine wealth is systematically higher under right-wing governments and 
                                                          
11 Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundel and Bond (1998) suggest another GMM estimator with 
additional moment conditions. If they are valid, they will increase the efficiency of the estimators. This is 
known as the system GMM estimator, which combines the moment conditions of the model in first 
differences with those of the model in levels. However, if the orthogonality conditions for the first-
difference equation are valid, but those for the level equation are not, then the system GMM may not be 
better than first-differences GMM. This can happen, for example, if the regressors used in the 
orthogonality conditions for the levels equation are correlated with the individual effects. Moreover, 
simulations suggest that the system GMM is not necessarily superior to the standard GMM in cases where 
the autoregressive parameter is below 0.8 and the time-series observations are relatively large (Blundell 
and Bond, 1998; Moshirian and Wu, 2012). This is what we observe in our data, so the estimator that 
seems to be more suitable for our empirical analysis is the one-step first-differences GMM estimator. 
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that there is no difference between left-wing and centrist governments. This suggests 
that we can be parsimonious and merge left-wing and centrist governments into one 
reference group and this is done in all subsequent specifications. From the specification 
reported in column (2), we observe that growth in genuine wealth is higher under right-
wing governments than under either left-wing or centrist governments. In column (3), 
we report, for comparison, a specification estimated with a fixed effects estimator rather 
than with the difference-GMM estimator used in the other specifications. We observe 
that the point estimate on Right is smaller than the GMM estimate reported in column 
(2), but statistically significant at the one percent level. The estimate of the persistence 
parameter is much large, as one would expect in the presence of Nickell bias. 
The positive effect of right-wing parties on GWgrowth is not just statistically 
significant, it is also of economic importance. The average growth rate of genuine 
wealth per capita is 0.62 with a standard deviation of 1.8 (see Table 1). Accordingly, 
based on the estimate from column (2), a switch from a left-wing or centrist to a right-
wing government increases the growth rate of genuine wealth in the average country by 
0.147 percentage points or by one twelfth of a standard deviation. The long-run effect is 
an increase of 0.29 (=0.147/(1-0.498)) percentage points. We interpret this as evidence 
that the fiscal conservatism of right-wing parties, their greater willingness to deregulate 
markets, and their focus on provision of merit goods pay off in terms of investments in 
the fundamental capital stocks and that this is sufficient to compensate for any under-
investment in natural capital. 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
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In contrast to the robust evidence on the partisan cycle, the timing of elections 
by itself does not appear to affect the growth rate of genuine wealth. The point estimate 
on Election year is never statistically different from zero, rejecting the idea of an 
opportunistic election cycle in genuine investment.12 This is not entirely surprising. 
After all, it takes time to enact policies with a substantive effect on genuine investment 
and, on top of that, it is hard for voters to observe and attribute short-term fluctuations 
in these investments to government policy. An implication, then, is that it is not 
elections per se that create cycles in genuine investment. Rather the cycles are created 
by underlying ideological differences with regard to economic policy that filter through 
to investments in genuine wealth over the tenure of a government with a particular 
political ideology. In Section 5, we dwell deeper into the role played by the length of 
time a government has been in office. 
The partisan cycles in genuine investment are a short to medium run phenomena 
that can cause a country to move on or off a sustainable path over time. In contrast, the 
nature of the underlying political institutions can have a longer-term effect on the 
investments that a society makes in its fundamental capital stocks. More importantly, it 
is likely that the nature of the partisan cycle is, at least in part, a function of the 
underlying institutions. If so, we run the risk of conflating the two. To investigate this 
issue, column (4), in Table 2, reports a specification that controls for Polity IV index. 
This index is a comprehensive summary measure of the quality of the political 
institutions in a country at a given point in time. We observe that the point estimate on 
                                                          
12 In additional experiments – not reported here, but available upon request – we have investigated if there 
is an election cycle in those elections which resulted in a change in the political orientation of the 
government, if there is an effect in pre- and post-election years, or if it matters how long the interval 
between elections is. In all cases, we find no evidence of an election cycle. 
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Right is a little smaller than previously (0.126) but remains significant.13 In contrast, the 
point estimate on Polity IV Index is far from statistically significant. Similar results are 
obtained for other broad measures of institutions. It, therefore, appears that the partisan 
cycle in genuine investment is separate from any effect that might come from variations 
in the broader institutional environment. 
Yet, the many important differences in party systems that clearly exist make it, 
as previously noted, a challenge to measure differences in political ideology 
consistently across time and space. One way to engage with this is to investigate 
potential heterogeneity across subsamples of countries with broadly similar party 
systems. In Table 2, columns (5) and (6), we report specifications that split the overall 
sample into an OECD and a non-OECD sample. We observe that there is a strong 
partisan cycle in both samples, but that the point estimate on Right is larger for the 
sample of non-OECD countries.14 One the one hand, this suggests that the direction and 
qualitative nature of the association between political ideology and sustainable 
development is the same across societies at different levels of development and with 
different party systems. On the other hand, it also suggests that the amplitude of the 
cycle is larger outside the OECD democracies, possibly because the differences in the 
ideological stance of left- and right-wing governments with regard to economy policy 
are larger in non-OECD democracies.15 
                                                          
13 This result is robust to the use of other summary indicators for the quality of institutions than the Polity 
IV index, including controls for type of political regime (Presidential versus Parliamentarian) and for the 
election system (Majority versus Proportional Rule). 
14 While in the group of OECD countries the growth rate of genuine wealth per capita is, on average, 0.13 
percentage points higher when a right-wing party is in office, in the non-OECD countries it is 0.24 
percentage points higher, ceteris paribus. 
15 Besides the split between the OECD and non-OECD countries, we also investigated alternative sample 
splits. The results, which are available upon request, show that right-wing parties affects investment in 
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With regard to the set of economic control variables, we observe from Table 2 
that government consumption (Gov. consumption) have a negative impact on the growth 
rate of genuine wealth. GDP per capita is positively corrected with the growth rate of 
genuine wealth while Years of schooling is consistently insignificant and Trade 
openness and Urban pop. ratio are positive and significant only in the OECD 
subsample. Moreover, the positive relationship between right-wing parties and genuine 
investment is robust to changes in the proxies for the economy’s capital stocks and for 
the shadow prices.16 
 5. Additional results: Tenure in office 
 
In the same way as it takes time for the captain of a super tanker to change the 
ship’s course, it takes time for a government to change the package of economic 
policies and for these policies to filter through to investments in genuine wealth. A long 
period in power is generally necessary to allow a government to fully implement its 
medium-term policies. The more time a government spends in office, the more scope it 
has to ensure consistency across different dimensions of its economic and social 
policies. Frequent changes in government, on the other hand, tend to see such efforts 
interrupted or reverted. It is, therefore, reasonable, on the one hand, to expect that the 
number of years that a government rules could have an independent effect on genuine 
investment and, on the other, that it may interact with the partisan cycle we identified 
above. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
genuine wealth in presidential, plurality and proportional representation regimes and are observed in both 
high or low income countries/democracies. 
16 Those results are not reported here, to save space, but they are available upon request. 
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In all the specifications reported in Table 2, we include the variable Party tenure 
to investigate if years in office have an independent effect on GWgrowth. The answer is 
clearly no. The point estimate on this variable is insignificant, with the one exception 
that there is a marginally significant positive effect in the OECD sample (column (5)). It 
is, of course, possible that the impact of time in office is non-linear, reflecting the 
natural life cycle of governments. On the one hand, as already noted, more years in 
office enables a party to implement its policy agenda. On the other hand, the literature 
on vote and popularity functions documents that a government’s popularity erodes with 
time in office.17 As this “cost of ruling” reduces a government’s general popularity, it 
may switch to more populist policies. We may, therefore, observe a switch from 
medium-term policies that have a positive effect on genuine investment to short-term 
policies that have a negative effect as a government “ages” in office.18 This suggests 
that the relationship between time in office and investment in genuine wealth follows an 
inverted U-shaped relationship. Table 3, column (1), reports a specification with Party 
tenure and its square. We see that both coefficients are insignificant and that the point 
estimate on the indicator variable Right is unaffected by this. Taken together, this rejects 
the hypothesis that years in office exerts an independent (linear or non-linear) effect on 
genuine investment. 
This, however, does not rule out that time in office could interact with the 
partisan cycle in genuine investment. To test for this, we interact the indicator variable 
for right-wing parties, Right, with Party tenure and its square. Table 3, column (2), 
reports the results. We observe that the relationship between the years that a right-wing 
                                                          
17 See, for example, the seminal paper by Mueller (1970) and Veiga and Veiga (2004). 
18 This effect may be reinforced by the fact that there tend to be more natural or forced cabinet changes 
towards the end of the life-span of a government. This, in turn, may reduce the efficacy of medium-term 
policies since the strategies for implementing those policies normally depend on the leader’s vision. 
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party holds office and investment in genuine wealth follows an inverted U-shaped 
relationship.19 The estimated maximum is reached after 15 years in office. The average 
number of years in office is 7.5 years with a standard deviation of 9.45. Accordingly, 
most of our sample is located on the upwards sloping part of the relationship, but there 
are some observations also on the downwards sloping part. This suggests that while the 
policies enacted by right-wing parties are “good news” for sustainable development in 
general, the positive effect wears off with years in office and may, in some extreme 
cases, become negative. Columns (3) and (4) in Table 3 report results for the OECD and 
non-OECD subsamples, respectively. The non-linear effect is present in both.20 In Table 
3, columns (5) to (8), we investigate the effect of the years that the party leader (rather 
than the party itself) has been in power. Again, we find no direct effect (columns (5) and 
(6)), but the effect of right-wing parties on genuine investment does interact with the 
number of years that the party leader (Leader tenure) has been in power. The interaction 
is not, however, non-linear: only the interaction between Right and Leader tenure is 
statistically significant (column (8)). 
 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 6. Conclusions 
 
The question of sustainable development has become increasingly important for 
many observers and policymakers. Climate change, aging populations, debt crisis 
popping out in many countries and other important social and economic challenges have 
                                                          
19 The interaction Right*Party tenure is not statistically significant in specifications without the quadratic 
term. 
20 The maximum for the OECD sample is reached at 13 years in office, while for non-OECD countries it 
is estimated to be 24 years. 
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highlighted the importance of studying the subject. Sustainability is naturally linked to 
issues of governance in general and to policy decisions made by the governments in 
particular. These policy decisions depend on political ideology and electoral concerns. 
In this paper, we add to the substantial existing literature on the influence of 
political ideology and electoral politics on public policy by studying the effect of 
ideology on investment in genuine wealth. We find strong evidence that the 
government’s ideological colour matters and that investment in genuine wealth is higher 
when right-wing governments are in office. Economic conservatism attributed to right-
wing parties and their greater willingness to deregulate the economy may be driving this 
effect. These results are robust and hold across all alternative specifications and sub-
samples tested. In contrast, our results clearly rule out the existence of opportunistic 
election cycles. The expansion/contraction cycle near elections (if it actually occurs) 
does not seem to affect genuine investment. 
Furthermore, the time a right wing government remains in office also appears to 
positively impact sustainable development, although it seems that this positive effect 
decays over time. Increasing costs of ruling and overall efficiency reduction faced by 
governments may help explain this result. 
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Table 1. Description of the variables and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max 
GWgrowth  Growth in genuine wealth per capita; 
equal to adjusted net savings (excluding 
particulate emissions) multiplied by the 
GNI-wealth ratio (0.15 for developing and 
0.2 for industrialized countries) and 
subtracted by the average population 
growth rate. 
1817 0.62 1.80 -7.77 4.66 
Left Dummy variable that takes de value of 1 
when a left-wing party is in office; and 0, 
otherwise (center or right-wing party). 
2042 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Right Dummy variable that takes de value of 1 
when a right-wing party is in office; and 0, 
otherwise (centre or left-wing party). 
2042 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Party tenure The number of years a party is in office. 2029 7.54 9.45 1 71 
Leader tenure The number of years a chief executive is 
in office. 
2037 4.10 3.66 1 31 
Election year Dummy variable that takes de value of 1 
in the year of legislative elections; and 0, 
otherwise. 
2042 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Gov. consumption General government final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP). 
1999 16.60 5.62 2.80 54.52 
Years of schooling Average years of schooling. 1864 8.14 2.87 0.70 13.10 
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita (thousands of USD). 2012 15.79 15.89 0.19 86.13 
Trade openness Trade (Imports plus Exports as % of 
GDP). 
2027 71.88 39.95 9.10 352.90 
Urban pop. ratio Urban population over total population 
(%). 
2042 63.81 21.48 7.83 97.73 
Polity IV index Autocracy-Democracy index; it describes 
how democratic a country is in a polity 
scale ranging from -10 (strongly 
autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). 
1350 8.62 2.28 -8 10 
Sources: World Development Indicators (1970-2013) of the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/) for the dependent 
variable (see Arrow et al, 2003 and Aidt, 2011) and for the economic and demographic covariates. Database of Political 
Institutions (1970-2012), World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org) for the political variables. The institutional variable 
(Polity IV index) comes from the Polity IV database. 
Notes: The countries used in the estimations are the following: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Rep. Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
 
  
23 
 
Table 2. The effects of the political ideology on sustainable development 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
GWgrowtht-1 0.497*** 0.498*** 0.665*** 0.753*** 0.555*** 0.305** 
 (0.174) (0.174) (0.061) (0.123) (0.103) (0.120) 
Left 0.113      
 (0.083)      
Right 0.234*** 0.147*** 0.092*** 0.126** 0.133*** 0.241*** 
 (0.070) (0.049) (0.033) (0.049) (0.049) (0.093) 
Party tenure -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.007* -0.009 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) 
Election year 0.032 0.032 0.014 0.011 0.050 0.027 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.037) (0.035) (0.060) 
Gov. consumption -0.048** -0.048** -0.027*** -0.070*** -0.142*** -0.034** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.008) (0.021) (0.022) (0.016) 
Years of schooling -0.030 -0.034 -0.051 -0.023 0.117 -0.414 
 (0.138) (0.138) (0.053) (0.142) (0.127) (0.287) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 1.869*** 1.853*** 0.692** 1.642*** 0.924 2.227** 
 (0.631) (0.633) (0.272) (0.623) (0.722) (0.946) 
Trade openness -0.007 -0.007 0.001 -0.011 0.014** -0.016** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) 
Urban pop. ratio 0.037 0.036 0.011 0.025 0.057** 0.032 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.012) (0.033) (0.028) (0.047) 
Polity IV index    0.040   
    (0.067)   
       
       
# Observations 1533 1533 1637 1164 789 744 
# Countries 78 78 79 56 31 47 
# Instruments 82 81  82 81 81 
Sample Full Full Full Full OECD Non-OECD 
Hansen J-test 0.329 0.311  0.967 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.003 0.000 
AR(2) 0.264 0.267  0.332 0.237 0.150 
R2   0.526    
       
Notes: See Table 1 for definitions. The dependent variable is GWgrowth. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year 
fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A difference-GMM estimator is employed, except in 
regression (3) where a FE estimator is used instead; the lag of the dependent variable is treated as endogenous 
in the GMM estimations (only one-step estimates are reported here, but the results remain unchanged with a 
two-step estimator – those are not reported here but they are available upon request); the respective lagged 
values and the other explanatory variables are used as instruments in the first-difference equation; they were 
collapsed to avoid the problem of having too many instruments. The Hansen J-test reports the p-value for the 
null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for first and 
second order auto-correlated disturbances in the first differences equations. Separate estimations for OECD 
and non-OECD countries are reported in columns (5) and (6), respectively. Three OECD countries are dropped 
in the estimations: Estonia (due to few observations and lack of variability), Iceland (very few observations for 
the dependent variable) and Switzerland (no variability in the ideology; always right-wing governments). 
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Table 3. Ideology and time in office interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
GWgrowtht-1  0.496*** 0.491*** 0.556*** 0.300** 0.500*** 0.500*** 0.497*** 0.499*** 
 (0.174) (0.173) (0.100) (0.129) (0.173) (0.175) (0.174) (0.173) 
Right 0.143***    0.151*** 0.150***   
 (0.048)    (0.049) (0.049)   
Party tenure 0.009        
 (0.010)        
(Party tenure)^2 -0.000        
 (0.000)        
Right*Party tenure  0.030*** 0.026** 0.048**     
  (0.012) (0.011) (0.023)     
(Right*Party tenure)^2  -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001**     
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Leader tenure     0.007 -0.005   
     (0.009) (0.019)   
(Leader tenure)^2      0.001   
      (0.001)   
Right*Leader tenure       0.026 0.024** 
       (0.018) (0.010) 
(Right*Leader tenure)^2       -0.000  
       (0.001)  
Election year 0.026 0.021 0.049 0.003 0.024 0.027 0.020 0.020 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.035) (0.056) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) 
Gov. consumption -0.048** -0.048** -0.139*** -0.035** -0.048** -0.048** -0.048** -0.048** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 
Years of schooling -0.032 -0.021 0.141 -0.422 -0.036 -0.036 -0.029 -0.031 
 (0.138) (0.137) (0.125) (0.288) (0.141) (0.140) (0.142) (0.143) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 1.836*** 1.854*** 0.998** 2.196** 1.822*** 1.860*** 1.824*** 1.806*** 
 (0.629) (0.637) (0.509) (0.966) (0.633) (0.638) (0.633) (0.629) 
Trade openness -0.007 -0.007 0.014** -0.016** -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Urban pop. ratio 0.035 0.034 0.058** 0.030 0.032 0.030 0.032 0.032 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.027) (0.047) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) 
         
         
# Observations 1533 1533 789 744 1534 1534 1534 1534 
# Countries 78 78 31 47 78 78 78 78 
# Instruments 82 81 81 81 81 82 81 80 
Sample Full Full OECD Non-OECD Full Full Full Full 
Hansen J-test 0.351 0.337 1.000 1.000 0.243 0.292 0.281 0.147 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.272 0.268 0.245 0.138 0.264 0.260 0.254 0.255 
         
Notes: See Tables 1 and 2. The dependent variable is GWgrowth. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at 
which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A 
difference-GMM estimator is employed, where the lag of the dependent variable is treated as endogenous in the GMM 
estimations; the respective lagged values and the other explanatory variables are used as instruments in the first-difference 
equation; they were collapsed to avoid the problem of having too many instruments. Separate estimations for OECD and non-
OECD countries are reported in columns (3) and (4), respectively. 
 
 
